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I. INTRODUCTION
I
n the 1950s and 1960s, Gurley and Shaw (1955,
1960, 1967) advanced a particular view of the
joint evolution of per capita income and the
financial system. They observed that at low levels
of development, most investment is self-financed.
As per capita income rises, bilateral borrowing and
lending becomes more important. With further
increases in per capita income, banks and similar
financial intermediaries become prominent in
financing investment. Eventually, more sophisticated
financial markets, such as equity markets, arise. In
the Gurley and Shaw view, rising per capita income
and increasing financial depth reinforce each other.
Therefore, a model of the joint evolution of per
capita income and the banking system must allow
usage of banks to be endogenous, and the level of
per capita income and usage of banks must be
determined simultaneously.
Many poor countries have relatively poorly
developed financial systems. Why might this be the
case? One possibility is that at low levels of develop-
ment, the costs of financial intermediation are too
high relative to the benefits. There is ample evidence
that costs of accessing the banking system are high
in developing countries.1 In developing countries,
penetration of the formal banking system into rural
areas is limited; the high costs to the rural poor of
accessing banks, such as the costs of traveling to a
town with a bank branch and foregone income,
are frequently cited as a reason for low utilization
rates of banks. Even in the United States, about 13
percent of families do not have a checking account,
and when asked why not, about half cited high ser-
vice charges or other reasons related to the costs of
banking.2
However, another possibility is that monetary
policy also influences the choice between self-
financed and intermediated investment. Many
developing countries have relatively high nominal
interest rates and relatively low measures of finan-
cial depth, as measured, for example, by the ratio of
M2 to gross domestic product (GDP).3 Because the
nominal interest rate represents the opportunity cost
of holding currency, the relatively low rates at which
banks are used in many developing countries with
high nominal interest rates may seem puzzling. But
banks also hold reserves of currency to provide
liquidity to their depositors, and the rates of return
banks offer to their depositors—the degree to which
banks insure against depositors’ liquidity needs—
are influenced by the nominal interest rate. There-
fore, a model of the joint evolution of per capita
income and the banking system must also allow
monetary policy to affect the benefits of financial
intermediation—rates of return on deposits and to
what degree banks insure depositors against the
need for liquidity.
This paper considers a model in which both of
these factors—the resource cost of saving through
intermediaries and monetary policy, specifically the
money growth rate—are important determinants
of (i) whether banks are used and (ii) the level of
per capita income. Our model incorporates a fixed
resource cost of intermediation, similar to that in
Bencivenga and Smith (1998). It also incorporates
a role for monetary policy, by creating a role for
government-supplied fiat money.
We consider an overlapping-generations model
of capital accumulation with currency as a second
primary asset. Young agents can save their wage
income as currency or by investing in capital forma-
tion; or young agents can deposit their saving in
banks, which hold the primary assets (currency and
capital investment) on behalf of their depositors.
The model generates a transactions demand for
2 Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000).
3 For example, see Levine (1996).
1 See, for example, Gine (2001), who estimates the magnitude of trans-
actions costs of accessing banks in rural Thailand.
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© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.currency by subjecting each agent to a random shock
whose realization determines whether or not the
agent will be relocated across spatially separated
locations. In the event of relocation, an agent needs
currency to purchase consumption after relocation.
Also, any investment in capital formation under-
taken directly by a young agent who subsequently
is relocated is lost (both to the investor and socially).
Banks insure their depositors against the risk
of an adverse realization of the relocation shock,
by holding currency to pay a return to depositors
who end up being relocated. Also, since no capital
investment undertaken by banks is ever lost, a
depositor’s expected return (per unit deposited) is
higher than the expected return of a young agent
who holds the primary assets directly. However, in
this model, it is costly for agents to utilize banks;
specifically, agents incur a fixed resource cost when
they deposit their saving in a bank. This implies that
the returns on bank deposits must be sufficiently
high relative to the return on currency, and the
insurance that banks provide against the need for
liquidity arising from the risk of relocation must be
sufficiently good, for agents to be induced to utilize
banks. Agents may find it optimal to bear the fixed
costs of financial intermediation, or they may find
it optimal to avoid these costs by holding the primary
assets directly.
In this model, the money growth rate plays an
important role in agents’ decisions about whether
to utilize banks. The nominal interest rate represents
the opportunity cost of holding currency, and for
this reason, the degree of insurance optimally pro-
vided by banks against the need for liquidity falls
as the nominal interest rate rises. The model simul-
taneously determines the capital-labor ratio, the real
interest rate, per capita income, and the nominal
interest rate, as well as whether or not banks will
be used, as a function of the money growth rate.
The main results we obtain about the utilization
of banks, and the impact of monetary policy on the
utilization of banks, are as follows. Agents do not
use banks—they self-insure against the risk of relo-
cation by holding currency directly and self-finance
capital formation—for low values of the nominal
interest rate or (possibly, depending on parameter
values) for high values of the nominal interest rate.
At low nominal interest rates, capital is not much
better an asset than currency; the costs of holding
currency to self-insure against the risk of relocation
and of losing capital in the event of relocation are
relatively low, so agents avoid the fixed costs of
saving through banks. Higher money growth rates
shrink the range of low nominal interest rates for
which autarkic saving is optimal, but do not elimi-
nate it. Agents may also reject the use of banks
(depending on parameter values) at high nominal
interest rates. The higher the nominal interest rate,
the less insurance banks offer against the risk of
an adverse realization of the relocation shock. For
sufficiently high nominal interest rates, the value
of the insurance offered by banks is less than the
value of the resource cost of using banks. Higher
money growth rates exacerbate this effect, in that
they expand the range of high nominal interest rates
for which autarkic saving is optimal. Thus, a high
inflation rate can deter development of a banking
system.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Sections II and III lay out the environment and trade
in factor markets. Sections IV through VII derive the
optimal saving behavior of agents who save autar-
kically, and analyze the steady-state equilibrium
and stability properties of this equilibrium. In these
sections it is assumed that agents do not have access
to a banking system. Sections VIII through XII assume
that agents incur the transactions costs associated
with access to the banking system and that all saving
is intermediated. The optimal behavior of banks
and the laws of motion of the capital stock and
nominal interest rate are derived. Existence and
stability of steady-state equilibrium (or equilibria)
are analyzed. The comparative static effects of an
increase in the money growth rate are also analyzed.
Finally, Section XIII asks when agents will find it
optimal to save autarkically as opposed to utilizing
banks and discusses the impact of a change in the
money growth rate on that decision. Section XIV
concludes.
II. THE ENVIRONMENT
We consider a discrete time model, with time
indexed by t=1,2,… The economy consists of an
infinite sequence of two-period-lived, overlapping
generations. We ignore the initial old generation.
The model features two locations, or islands, across
which agents are distributed. At each date a contin-
uum of ex ante identical young agents with unit
mass is born in each location. Our assumptions
will guarantee that the locations are always sym-
metric, and the description that follows applies to
each location.
In each location in each period a single final
good is produced, using capital and labor as inputs
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Kt be the aggregate time t capital stock and letting
Lt be aggregate time t employment, output of the
final good is F(Kt,Lt). Defining kt ≡ Kt/Lt to be the
time t capital-labor ratio, let f(kt) ≡ F(Kt/Lt,1) denote
the intensive production function. For simplicity,
we assume that the production function has the
Cobb-Douglas form f(k)=Ak
α, with α ∈(0,1). In
addition, we assume that capital depreciates 100
percent in the production process.
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of
labor, which is supplied inelastically. Again, to attain
maximum simplicity, we assume that agents derive
utility from consumption only when old. Let ct
denote the second period consumption of an agent
born at t. Then the agent has the lifetime utility level
u(ct), where u(ct)=ct
1–ρ/(1–ρ). We assume through-
out that ρ ∈(0,1). This assumption implies that a
higher opportunity cost of holding currency induces
agents to economize on their balances of currency.4
In order to introduce a transactions role for
money, we follow Townsend (1980, 1987) and
emphasize the importance of limited communica-
tion between the two locations in the economy. In
particular, we assume that at each date an agent
can trade only with agents who inhabit his current
location and that there is no communication between
islands. Communication and record keeping within
any island pose no problems. However, between
dates t and t+1, each agent faces the probability 
π ∈(0,1) that he will be relocated to the other island.
When agents are relocated, they lose contact with
agents in their original location. Moreover, the
absence of communication between locations
implies that agents in their new location do not
know the asset position of relocated agents. Hence,
relocated agents will require currency to purchase
goods. On the other hand, agents who are not relo-
cated can purchase goods with credit instruments;
they do not require currency to make purchases.
Stochastic relocation, then, is a physical story about
which transactions do and do not require the use
of currency.
In addition to providing a framework that
requires currency to be used in some exchanges,
the presence of stochastic relocation implies that
agents face the risk of having to convert potentially
higher-yielding assets into currency. This risk repre-
sents an analog of the liquidity preference shock in
the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Agents will
wish to be insured against this shock. We will
describe situations under which they either self-
insure or are insured by banks.
This economy has two primary assets—currency
and physical capital. One unit of the final good
invested at t becomes one unit of capital at t+1.
Capital investment cannot be transported between
locations. As we have emphasized, spatial separation
and limited communication imply that relocated
agents require currency to consume. The economy’s
primary assets can be held directly by agents, or
they can be held by intermediaries. We now describe
the access of agents to intermediation.
We assume that each young agent can choose
to deposit his saving in a bank. However, utilization
of a bank is costly; saving in the form of bank
deposits involves a fixed cost of φ>0 units of the
final good. In other words, resources are “used up”
(lost to society) each time an agent saves through a
bank.5 Agents who use a bank will deposit all of
their saving (net of the fixed costs incurred in
accessing banks). Then, once agents’ relocation
shocks are realized, agents who must relocate con-
tact their banks again (in a decentralized manner)
and withdraw cash that is taken to the agents’ new
location. Agents who are not relocated will not
require cash to purchase the consumption good;
they can use checks, credit cards, or other credit
instruments. There is, of course, an alternative to
using intermediaries. Agents can hold the econ-
omy’s primary assets directly, thereby avoiding the
incurrence of the fixed cost, φ. However, avoiding
the fixed cost requires that an agent invest autarki-
cally, which prevents the sharing of relocation risk.
We describe below the circumstances under which
agents will and will not choose to use banks.
As is typical in models of spatial separation and
limited communication, the timing of events within
a period is of considerable importance. In this econ-
omy, the timing of events is as follows. At the begin-
ning of a period, production of the final good occurs
and factors are paid. Each young agent supplies his
labor inelastically, earning the prevailing real wage.
All of this wage income is saved. At this point, each
young agent decides whether to hold the primary
assets directly (i.e., to allocate his saving between
holdings of currency and the investment technology)
or to save in the form of bank deposits. If saving is
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5 The notion that utilizing a bank involves a fixed cost has a long tradi-
tion in macroeconomics, a tradition that is reflected, for instance, in
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). 
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4 See Schreft and Smith (1998).intermediated, banks make their portfolio decisions.
The goods market clears, with output of the final
good going to investment in capital formation,
government purchases (described below), and
consumption on the part of old agents. Later in the
same period, each young agent learns the realization
of his relocation shock. By assumption, young agents
do not meet after their relocation status is realized
(unless saving is intermediated, in which case they
may contact their banks). Therefore, relocated agents
who save and invest autarkically lose the value of
their investment in the technology to produce physi-
cal capital, because capital investment cannot be
transported between locations. On the other hand,
if saving is intermediated, relocated agents return
to their banks and withdraw currency. Relocated
agents carry currency to their new location, using
it to purchase consumption when old. Agents who
are not relocated take no action until the beginning
of the next period, at which point they consume
the gross return on their asset holdings (currency
and capital, if saving and investment is autarkic, or
bank deposits, if saving is intermediated). The timing
of events is depicted in Figure 1.6Figure 1A describes
the case of autarkic saving, and Figure 1B the case
of intermediated saving.
In addition to the old and young agents and
(potentially) banks in each location, this economy
has a government. The government prints money
and purchases the final good. Let Mt be the nomi-
nal money supply, per young agent, at t. Mt evolves
according to Mt+1=σMt, with σ being chosen once
and for all at the beginning of time. If pt denotes
the time t price level, then seigniorage revenue of
the government at t is 
We assume that the government uses this revenue
to purchase the final good. Government purchases
of the final good do not affect agents’ saving behavior
or portfolio allocations. Note that this way of inject-
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6 Notice that we have compressed all the events against which agents
want to be insured into one period. This convention follows Champ,
Smith, and Williamson (1996) and Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998). It
implies that there are no opportunities for intergenerational inter-
actions through the banking system.
Figure 1
































Relocation occursing money restricts us to the case σ ≥ 1; that is, there
can be no contraction of the money supply. This
restriction is not particularly important here. As we
will see, with this restriction certain commonly con-
sidered contractionary policies, such as the Friedman
rule, are infeasible in a nontrivial equilibrium of
this model.
III. TRADE IN FACTOR MARKETS
At the beginning of period t, firms hire labor and
rent capital. These trades take place in competitive
factor markets in each location. Let wt denote the
time t real wage rate, and let rt denote the time t
capital rental rate. Then the following standard factor
pricing relationships obtain in each location:
(1)
(2) .
IV. BEHAVIOR OF AGENTS WHO SAVE
AUTARKICALLY
From this point, we will proceed by describing
(i) how agents behave if they save by holding the
primary assets of the economy directly and (ii) how
agents and banks behave if agents save in the form
of bank deposits. Then we will discuss conditions
under which young agents will choose to incur the
fixed cost necessary for saving to be intermediated.
We begin with the behavior of agents who save
autarkically.
A young agent at t earns the real wage wt, all of
which is saved. If he saves autarkically, he divides
his saving between holdings of currency and invest-
ment in physical capital. Let γat denote the fraction
of saving held in the form of real money balances
by a young agent at t; then 1–γat is the fraction held
in the form of capital investment. The gross real
return on holdings of currency between t and t+1
is pt/pt+1, and the gross real return on capital invest-
ment held from t to t+1 is rt+1 (since capital depre-
ciates 100 percent). Agents behave competitively in
asset markets, taking these returns as unaffected
by their own saving behavior. Lifetime expected
utility of a young agent is given by the expression
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which he maximizes by choice of γat. Notice that
the young agent’s expected utility is the probability
of being relocated multiplied by utility generated by
the consumption that can be purchased when old
with the agent’s real balances, plus the probability
of not being relocated multiplied by utility generated
by consumption of the proceeds of the agent’s capi-
tal, as well as purchases with his real balances, when
old. To emphasize, relocated agents cannot move
or trade claims to their capital investment, which is
simply lost.
The solution to the problem of an autarkic
young agent sets
where It ≡ rt+1(pt+1/pt) is the gross nominal rate of
interest. The nominal interest rate, of course, repre-
sents the opportunity cost of holding currency.
Several properties of the function γa(It) will be use-
ful in the subsequent analysis. These properties are
stated in the following lemma. Its proof appears in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1.
(a) γa(It)=1 holds for all  . γa(It)<1
holds for all .
(b) .
(c) For , satisfies
.
V. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH
AUTARKIC SAVING
Young agents at t earn the real wage w(kt), all
of which is saved. The fraction γa(It) of their saving
is held in the form of real balances, and the fraction
1–γa(It) is held as capital investment. Hence, if mt ≡
(Mt/pt) denotes the outstanding per capita supply
of real balances at t, the money market clears if
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kt+1, is given by
(4) 
Equation (4) obtains because a fraction 1–γa(It) of
saving is invested in capital formation and the frac-
tion π of capital investment is lost due to relocation
of some agents.7
The gross nominal rate of interest at t is given
by
(5) .
Substituting (1) and (3) into (5) yields the equi-
librium law of motion for It when agents save
autarkically:
.
Upon substituting (4) into this law of motion,
we obtain
(6)      .
VI. STEADY STATE UNDER AUTARKIC
SAVING
Imposing It=It+1 in equation (6) yields the fol-
lowing steady-state equilibrium condition:
(7) .
Lemma 1 implies that (7) has a unique solution with
I>(1/1–π). Clearly, the steady-state value of the
gross nominal rate of interest is an increasing func-
tion of the money growth rate. It is also straightfor-
ward to show that, in a steady state,
.
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steady-state real interest rate, I/σ=f′(k), declines.
To sum up, when agents save autarkically, a higher
rate of money creation leads to a higher steady-state
nominal rate of interest, a lower real rate of interest,
and a higher steady-state capital stock. Intuitively,
this occurs because a higher nominal rate of interest
implies a higher opportunity cost of holding cur-
rency. As a result, young agents substitute away
from real balances and into capital investment. This
leads to a higher steady-state capital stock and clearly
constitutes a version of the Mundell-Tobin effect.
Notice that it is impossible for this economy to
have a nontrivial equilibrium under the Friedman
rule (that is, setting It=1). This is because the
Friedman rule makes currency such a good asset
that agents will hold it to the exclusion of any other,
and no capital investment will ever occur.8
Example: Assume the following parameter val-
ues: φ=0.1, α=0.35, ρ=0.95, σ=1.05, A=1, and
π=0.3. The (gross) nominal interest rate in an autar-
kic steady state is 1.97, and γa, the share of saving
held as currency, is 0.59.
VII. DYNAMICS UNDER AUTARKIC
SAVING
The equilibrium law of motion for It given in
equation (6) is depicted in Figure 2. It is easy to show
that (6) gives It+1 as an increasing function of It and
that the steady state is unstable. This means that the
steady state is the unique equilibrium.
VIII. AN ECONOMY WITH
INTERMEDIATED SAVING
We now turn our attention to an economy where
saving is intermediated. For the present, we simply
assume that all saving is intermediated. Later, we
provide conditions under which this is the optimal
choice for young agents.
When young agents save through banks, they
incur the fixed transactions cost, φ. They then
deposit all remaining saving (each young agent
deposits wt–φ at date t) in banks.9 Banks promise
a gross real return of dt
m to young agents who are
relocated between t and t+1, and a gross real return
of dt to those who are not, per unit of the final good
12 JULY/AUGUST 2003
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8 See Smith (2002), who makes a similar point in a model without
capital accumulation. In his economy it is feasible to follow the
Friedman rule in a nontrivial equilibrium, but it is not optimal to do so.
9 As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), all savings will be deposited in
banks if agents strictly prefer intermediated to autarkic savings.
7 It is not essential to our analysis that all capital held by relocated
agents is abandoned. The model easily could be modified so that
ownership of capital held by relocated agents is transferred to non-
relocated agents in a post-relocation shock asset market where some
transactions costs are incurred. The term 1–π in equation (4) would
then be replaced by a term that reflects the transactions costs associ-
ated with transferring ownership of capital investment. This change
would have little effect on our analysis. The central point is that owner-
ship of capital investment does not need to be transferred between
agents when capital investment is intermediated.deposited at t. Banks allocate deposits between
reserves of currency and investment in capital, prior
to realization of agents’ relocation shocks. After
banks allocate their portfolios, agents who must
relocate contact their banks in a decentralized
manner and withdraw their deposits, with interest,
in the form of currency. Banks must give these agents
adequate quantities of currency for them to be able
to consume at the promised level in their new loca-
tion at t+1. Agents who are not relocated can make
purchases with checks or other credit instruments
at t+1. Let γbtdenote the fraction of a bank’s assets
that are held in the form of currency and 1–γbt
denote the fraction held as investment in capital.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a bank can
be thought of as a coalition of ex ante identical
young agents. A bank will then choose real rates of
return on deposits and a reserve-to-deposit ratio (γbt)
to maximize the expected utility of a representative
depositor, subject to the following constraints. First,
young agents who must relocate must be given
enough currency to deliver the promised gross real
return, dt
m, between t and t+1. Since the gross real
return on currency carried between t and t+1 is
pt/pt+1, this constraint requires that
(8) .
If currency is dominated in rate of return,10 then
agents who remain in their original location will be
paid out of the returns on the bank’s investment in
capital. This return is simply the capital rental rate
in t+1 (since capital depreciates 100 percent). There-
fore, the second constraint requires that
(9) .
Banks take the gross real returns on the primary
assets, pt/pt+1 and rt+1, as given. Then a bank at t
chooses dt
m, dt, and γbt to maximize the expected
utility of a representative depositor
,
subject to the constraints (8) and (9) and non-
negativity.
The optimal reserve-to-deposit ratio of a bank
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(10) .
Using (10), a bank’s optimal deposit return
schedule can be recovered from (8) and (9). It is easy
to show that dt=It
1/ρdt
m holds at an optimum. With
positive nominal rates of interest (It>1), banks do
not provide complete insurance against the risk of
relocation. This is because they must hold currency
to provide insurance against the risk of relocation,
and holding currency involves an opportunity cost
that is reflected in the nominal rate of interest. As
this opportunity cost rises, banks provide less
insurance.
Various properties of the function γb(I) will be






Notice that, when saving is intermediated, setting
the gross nominal interest rate equal to unity does
not induce agents to save exclusively in the form of
real balances. This contrasts with the situation of
autarkic saving. When saving is intermediated, with-
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10 As we have noted, currency will be dominated in rate of return (It>1
will hold) in any nontrivial equilibrium. When currency is dominated
in rate of return, banks will not carry reserves of currency between
periods.
11 For a proof of lemma 2, see Schreft and Smith (1998).




Figure 2no reason for banks to hold precautionary reserves.
For autarkic savers, only currency can provide com-
plete insurance against relocation risk, and agents
will hold only currency if It=1. As we will see, if
It=1, autarkic saving will be optimal, but part (a)
of lemma 2 will prove useful nonetheless. Finally,
part (c) of the lemma indicates that, with ρ<1, an
increase in the nominal rate of interest induces
banks to economize on their holdings of reserves.
This is clearly the intuitively appealing (and empiri-
cally supported) case.12
IX. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH
INTERMEDIATED SAVING
When all saving is intermediated, all beginning-
of-period demand for currency derives from banks.
Each young agent deposits his saving, net of the
transactions cost (wt–φ), and each bank holds the
fraction γb(It) of deposits in the form of reserves of
currency. Hence, at date t, the money market clears
if
(11) .
Banks invest 1–γbt of deposits in capital formation.
In contrast to the situation of autarkic saving, capital
investment is not lost when agents relocate (since
capital investment is undertaken by banks). There-
fore, the per capita capital stock evolves according to
(12) .
The condition that determines the evolution of
the gross nominal rate of interest remains to be
stated. By definition,
(13) .
Substituting (1) and (11) into (13) yields
(14)
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Equations (12) and (15) constitute the equilib-
rium laws of motion for kt and It. We begin with a
consideration of steady states.
X. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIA UNDER
INTERMEDIATED SAVING
Imposing It=It+1=I and kt+1=kt=k in equation
(14) yields one of the steady-state equilibrium
conditions:
(16) .
Under our assumption of Cobb-Douglas production,





condition into (12), rearranging terms, and making
use of (17) gives a condition that determines the
steady-state value(s) of I:
(18)   ,
with µ ≡φ(αA)
1/(α–1). Some properties of the func-
tion H(I) are stated in the following lemma. Its
proof appears in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.
(a) H′(I)≥ 0 holds if and only if
.
(b) H(I)≥ 0 holds if and only if  .
(c) H(I) is a concave function of I.
Lemma 3 implies that there are three possibili-
ties concerning the existence of steady-state equi-
libria with intermediated saving. These are depicted
in Figure 3.
Case 1. If ,  ,  and 
hold, we have the situation depicted in Figure 3A.
Since H(I) is concave, and since it is easy to verify
that  is a convex function of I, equation (18) 1
1− () γ b I
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12 Goldfeld (1966) reports an interest elasticity of excess reserves (all
reserves here are excess reserves) of –0.3. Schreft and Smith (2002)
report that this figure continues to be widely used in policy circles.has two solutions. These are the candidate steady
states when all saving is intermediated.
Case 2. If  , we have the situation depicted
in Figure 3B. Equation (18) has only one solution






Case 3. It is possible that equation (18) has no solu-
tions. This can happen if the fixed cost of contacting
a bank is too large, for example. In this case, depicted
in Figure 3C, there are no steady-state equilibria
where all saving is intermediated.
XI. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A
CHANGE IN MONETARY POLICY
We now indicate how a change in the money
growth rate, σ, affects the nominal rate of interest
and the capital stock in a steady-state equilibrium
with intermediation. We focus on case 1; from that
it will be apparent what effects a change in σ has
in case 2.
Figure 4 depicts the consequences of an increase
in σ, which shifts the function H(I) down (up) if
H′(I)>(<)0. Notice that, in each candidate steady
state, an increase in the rate of money creation has
the effect of increasing I, the gross nominal rate of
interest. The consequences of higher money growth
rates for the steady-state capital stock, however,
depend on which of the two steady states obtains.
The relevant result is reported in proposition 1,
which is proved in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. ∂k/∂σ>(<)0 holds in the steady
state with the low (high) nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1 says that at the steady state
where H′(I)>(<)0, an increase in the rate of money
creation raises (lowers) the steady-state capital stock
(as well as steady-state output). Thus, the long-run
real effects of a higher rate of money growth depend
on which steady state obtains.
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A. Two Steady States with Banks
B. One Steady State with Banks
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Figure 4Of course, in a case 2 economy, there is a single
steady state with H′(I)<0. In a case 2 economy, a
higher rate of money creation (a higher steady-state
rate of inflation) reduces the per capita capital stock
and per capita output.
XII. DYNAMICS WITH INTERMEDIATED
SAVING
The dynamic system governing the evolution
of {kt,It} consists of equations (12) and (15). In this
section, we analyze local dynamics in a neighbor-
hood of a steady-state equilibrium. The stability
properties of a steady-state equilibrium depend on
the number of steady states and their configuration.
For this reason, we consider case 1 and case 2
economies separately.
Case 1. Here there are two candidate steady-state
equilibria. Appendix D establishes the following
result.
Proposition 2. In a case 1 economy, the low (high)
nominal interest rate steady state is a saddle (source).
Because it is a source, the high nominal interest
rate steady state cannot be approached from any
nearby point. There is a unique path converging to
the low nominal interest rate steady state, which is
a saddle. In addition, it is easy to verify that dynamics
in a neighborhood of the low nominal interest rate
steady state are monotone.
Case 2. In a case 2 economy, there is a unique steady
state. In Appendix E we prove the following claim.
Proposition 3. The steady state is a source.
It is therefore unclear what happens in a case 2
economy asymptotically, even if initial conditions
put the economy in a neighborhood of the steady
state. An analysis of global dynamics would be
necessary; however, such an analysis is beyond the
scope of the present paper.
Example: The parameter values are the same
as in the example in Section VI. With intermediation
of saving, these parameter values produce a case 1
economy. The two steady-state nominal interest rates
are 1.12039 and 10.2615. For both steady states, the
Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of (12) and
(15), evaluated at the steady state, has real eigen-
values. The low nominal interest rate steady state
is a saddle, and the high nominal interest rate steady
state is a source.
XIII. WHEN IS SAVING INTERMEDIATED?
To this point we have imposed either that agents
save autarkically, or that agents’ saving is intermedi-
ated, and we examined the potential equilibria
emerging in each case. In this section we turn our
attention to conditions under which agents will
find it optimal to incur the fixed cost associated
with intermediated saving.
We begin by considering the lifetime expected
utility of an agent who saves autarkically. This (maxi-
mized) utility level is given by the expression
It is easily verified that
Therefore,
The (maximized) lifetime expected utility of

























































































































































































































































































































Bencivenga and Smith R EVIEW.
Agents will save autarkically at date t if and
only if
(19) .
Based on our previous observations, the condition
(19) is equivalent to
(20)
If the autarkic candidate equilibrium real wage
and nominal rate of interest at t satisfy (20), then
there exists an equilibrium in which agents save
autarkically at t.
Clearly the properties of the function Q(I) will
be important in the subsequent analysis. These
properties are stated in the following lemma, whose





(d) Q′(I)≤0 holds for all  For 
Q′(I)<0 holds if π≥1/2. If π<1/2, then Q′(I)≤(>)0
if and only if  , where  is the unique solution
to
(21)
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and therefore, in autarky, (22) becomes
(23)    ,
where .
The relevant properties of the function T(I) are





(c) If Q′(I)≤0, T′(I)<0 holds.
(d) T(I)=1 holds at (at most) two points.
Lemma 5 implies that the locus of nominal
interest rates for which agents prefer autarky,
described by (23), has the possible configurations
depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 5A, (23) holds only
for low values of the nominal interest rate. The
intuition behind Figure 5A is straightforward; when
the nominal interest rate is low, currency is a rela-
tively good asset and the resource cost to an agent
of saving through a bank exceeds the value of the
insurance against an adverse realization of the relo-
cation shock provided by the bank. In Figure 5B, (23)
holds for two disjoint ranges of values of the nominal
interest rate, implying that agents save autarkically
for either low or high values of the nominal interest
rate. The intuition behind the range of low values
for which (23) holds is the same as in Figure 5A. The
intuition behind the possibility that (23) holds for a
range of high values of the nominal interest rate is
as follows. As the nominal interest rate increases,
banks provide less insurance against an adverse
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1/ρd
m, implying that the wedge
between the rates of return offered by banks to
non-relocated and relocated agents increases as I
increases.) For parameter values leading to the
configuration of T(I) in Figure 5B, there is some
value of I above which the insurance provided by
banks deteriorates to the point where an agent
values this insurance less than the agent values
the resources it would cost to access a bank.
Note that the rate of money growth, σ, is held
constant along T(I); along T(I), the steady-state
nominal interest rate changes due to an underlying
change in the capital-labor ratio, with (i) low capital-
labor ratios corresponding to high values of the
marginal product of capital and (ii) high nominal
interest rates (given the rate of money growth). In
Figure 5B, the upper range of values of I for which
a steady state will be autarkic corresponds to low
capital-labor ratios and low wages. For a steady state
in this range, the insurance against relocation pro-
vided by banks is relatively poor, while the fixed
cost of accessing banks is high relative to the wage;
as a result, agents optimally engage in autarkic saving.
How does monetary policy—a change in the
money growth rate—affect the choice between
autarkic saving and saving through banks? Here, too,
the range of high values of the nominal interest
rate for which autarky will be chosen in Figure 5B
generates an interesting possibility. To see this, we
must establish the comparative static effects of an
increase in the money growth rate on T(I), which
are summarized in the following proposition and
illustrated in Figure 6A.
Proposition 4. In response to an increase in σ,
T(I) shifts down (up) if T′(I)<(>)0 at T(I)=1.
(Proposition 4 is proved in Appendix H.)
In Figure 6A, the economy may exhibit an
autarkic steady state if the nominal interest rate is
either low or high. Starting from an autarkic steady
state, an increase in the money growth rate will
raise the nominal interest rate (despite lowering
the steady-state marginal product of capital).
Proposition 4 implies the following: Starting from
an autarkic steady state with a low nominal interest
rate and raising that rate (by increasing the money
growth rate) may move the steady state into one in
which saving optimally is intermediated. This possi-
bility is illustrated in Figure 6B: Point A, which is
initially an autarkic steady state, moves to the right
as a result of an increase in σ, while T(I) shifts to
18 JULY/AUGUST 2003
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A. Agents Choose Autarky at a Low
Nominal Interest Rate
B. Agents Choose Autarky at a Low







T(I)<1: Agents use banks
T(I)≥1: Agents do not use banks
T(I)≥1: Agents do not use banks
T(I)<1: Agents use banks
Figure 5













Figure 6the left. However, starting from an autarkic steady
state in which the nominal interest rate is high, an
increase in σwill leave the economy with an autarkic
steady state; see point B in Figure 6B.
For an economy with parameter values leading
to the configuration of T(I) in Figure 5B, a higher
money growth rate lowers the threshold for the
upper range of nominal interest rates at which agents
save autarkically. A higher money growth rate there-
fore increases the range of nominal interest rates
for which banks will be unable to provide sufficiently
good insurance against agents’ liquidity needs to
make utilization of banks worthwhile.
There are a number of historical episodes in
which a sudden, substantial reduction in the infla-
tion rate, due to fiscal reform and correspondingly
reduced reliance on seigniorage, was followed by
rapid development of the banking system. For exam-
ple, in Argentina, the ratio of deposit money bank
assets to GDP, which is a measure of the size of the
banking system, increased from an average of 0.178
for 1983-91 to an average of 0.216 for 1992-97.13
During most of the earlier period, Argentina’s money
supply expanded very rapidly due to large govern-
ment budget deficits that were being monetized, and
the adoption of a currency board in 1991 removed
any possibility of reliance on seigniorage. Similarly,
Brazil’s fiscal reforms of 1994 caused an increase
from an average of 0.227 for 1980-93 to an average
of 0.361 for 1994-97. Bolivia’s fiscal reforms at the
end of 1985, which ended a period of government
budget deficits and rapid money growth culminating
in a short but severe hyperinflation, provides a
dramatic example. The ratio of deposit money bank
assets to GDP increased from an average of 0.08 for
1975-85 to an average of 0.28 for 1986-97, and it
experienced a strong trend during this latter period,
increasing from 0.063 in 1986 to 0.497 in 1997.
These episodes are consistent with the model here,
in which a reduction in the money growth rate
may change the steady-state equilibrium from one
without banks to one with banks, by increasing the
degree to which the structure of bank deposit rates
offered by banks insure depositors against liquidity
shocks.
XIV. CONCLUSION
In the world, we see countries with low levels
of per capita income, low utilization rates of banks,
apparently high costs of utilizing banks, and, in
some cases, high inflation rates and high nominal
interest rates. Here, we have explored the implica-
tions of a model in which both the resource costs
associated with banking and monetary policy are
important factors determining whether or not banks
are utilized, and in which this decision is analyzed
jointly with the determination of per capita income
and the nominal interest rate. Our results suggest
that monetary policy exerts an important influence
over both financial and real development. By altering
the opportunity cost of holding currency, a change
in the money growth rate affects—in quite complex
ways—the relative costs and benefits of self-financed
investment and self-insurance against liquidity
needs, on the one hand, and financial intermedia-
tion, on the other hand.
One result that we believe to be especially
interesting is the possibility that banks will not be
used for high values of the nominal interest rate.
As mentioned earlier, many developing countries
have relatively high nominal interest rates and rela-
tively low utilization rates of banks. Since the nom-
inal interest rate represents the cost of holding
currency, this observation seems puzzling at first
glance. Our model suggests that this observation
might be explained by the negative impact of high
money growth rates and high inflation rates on the
degree to which banks insure depositors against
liquidity shocks.
There are several directions in which this analy-
sis could be extended. One would be to investigate
a more sophisticated model of the resource costs
of banking. For example, the average cost of inter-
mediation (per unit deposited) may be a decreasing
function of the volume of saving through the bank-
ing system. The impact of subsidizing the costs of
banking also could be studied. Another possible
line of inquiry would involve the alternative ways
in which the government’s purchases of the final
good are used and alternative methods for injecting
base money into the economy.
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Appendix
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 1.
Parts (a) and (b) of the lemma follow from the definition of γa. For part (c), differentiation yields
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 3.
Differentiating H(I) yields
.
Part (a) of the lemma follows immediately. Part (b) follows immediately from the definition of H(I). For
part (c), we have
.
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
Differentiation of equation (18) with respect to σ yields
(A.1)
.
Rearranging terms in (A.1), one obtains
.
From part (a) of lemma 3, it is then apparent that  if H′(I)>0 holds and that  if
H′(I)<0 holds.
Now note that f′(k)=I/σ, so that  . Thus  holds if
H′(I)>(<)0. 
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D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
We begin by linearizing equations (12) and (15) in a neighborhood of a steady state. Doing so yields
the linear approximation (kt–k,It–I)′=J(kt–1–k,It–1–I)′, where k and I denote steady-state values and
where J is the standard Jacobian matrix with partial derivatives evaluated at the appropriate steady state.
To derive some properties of J, we begin with the following observations.
First, differentiation of equation (12) implies that
and
.





Third, differentiation of equation (15) yields
(A.5)
,
where the second equality follows from (A.2), (A.3), and the expression for ∂kt+1/∂kt. In addition,
(A.6)
,
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Now let T denote the trace of J and D denote the determinant of J. From the preceding expressions it





where the last equality follows from
(A.9) .
Equations (A.7) and (A.8) imply that either J has two positive real eigenvalues or the eigenvalues of J are
complex conjugates. Also, clearly
(A.10) .
We now make two observations. One is that equation (A.9) implies that
.
The second is that, from (18),
.
From these observations, it follows that
.
It therefore follows that T>(<)1+D holds if and only if
(A.11)                                 
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Appendix cont’d
We now note that
.
Thus, from (A.11), T>(<)1+D holds if and only if
.
Thus T>(<)1+D is satisfied at steady states where H′(I)>(<)0. It follows that the low nominal interest
rate steady state is a saddle and that dynamics in a neighborhood of it are monotone. The high nominal
interest rate steady state is a source if D>1 holds (Azariadis, 1993). It is straightforward to show that the
condition T<1+D is equivalent to
.
Since the second term on the right exceeds 1, then, clearly, satisfaction of the condition T<1+D implies
D>1. This establishes the proposition.
E. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.
The proposition follows immediately from the fact that the only steady state has H′(I)<0 and from
the observations in the proof of proposition 2.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.
Part (a) of the lemma is obvious from the definition of Q(I). For part (b), L’Hopital’s rule implies that
. Part (b) of the lemma then follows from continuity.
To establish part (c), differentiate the definition of Q(I) to obtain
(A.12)
,
where the second equality follows from applying lemmas 1 and 2. Moreover,
(A.13)
holds. Substituting (A.13) into (A.12) yields the expression in part (c) of the lemma.
Clearly Q′(I)≤0 holds if and only if  . For  ,  is satisfied. For
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It is straightforward to show that (A.14) holds for all I ≥1 if π ≥1/2. If π<1/2, then it is easily shown that
(A.14) has a unique solution,  , with  . This completes the proof.
G. PROOF OF LEMMA 5.
Part (a) of the lemma follows from part (a) of lemma 1 and part (a) of lemma 4. Part (b) follows from
part (b) of lemma 1 and part (b) of lemma 4. To obtain part (c), note that
.
Since ,  ,  and  Q(I)≥0, it is clear that Q′(I)<0 implies T′(I)<0.
To prove part (d) of the lemma, suppose that T′(I)≥0 holds at some value of I that satisfies (23) at
equality. At that value of I
(A.15)
.
Note that if T′(I)≥0, then necessarily Q′(I)>0, γb(I)≥γa(I), and  is increasing in I, so the right-hand
side of (A.15) is increasing in I. Also, the left-hand side of (A.15) equals
,
which is decreasing in I.
Therefore, if T′(I1)≥0 for some I1 satisfying (23) with equality, then for any I2>I1 satisfying (23) with
equality, T′(I2)≥0 also must hold. This is a contradiction. This establishes that there is at most one value
of I at which T(I)=1, for which T′(I)≥0. This completes the proof.
H. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.
Differentiation of equation (7) yields
,
which implies that
since  . Obviously  , and therefore the sign of  depends on the sign of T′(I). 
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